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Foreign Banking in the United States: Growth
and Regulatory Issues
FRANCIS A. LEES*
INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1960s witnessed a rapid development of over-
seas banking activities by American banks. Large U.S. banking insti-
tutions established overseas branch offices, acquired foreign subsidi-
ary banks and finance companies, and participated more actively in
global lending. By contrast the 1970s have brought a substantial
inflow of foreign banks to the United States. Foreign banking institu-
tions have established branch offices in several leading metropolitan
centers across the United States, have established or acquired subsid-
iary commercial banks in a number of important states, and ex-
panded their loan and investment banking services. In 1974 some 160
foreign banks held loan and investment assets in the United States
aggregating over $40 billion.'
Why have foreign banks developed a heightened interest in oper-
ating from a U.S. base, and is this development likely to persist? How
might the growing presence of foreign banks affect the role and func-
tioning of credit markets in this country? Finally, does the acceler-
ated influx of foreign banking institutions in this country necessitate
a review and possible modernization of the manner in which banking
is regulated in the United States?
This article seeks to find answers to the questions posed above.
The problem of bank regulation is given special attention in view of
the numerous regulatory proposals that have been made in Congress
during the past three years.
GROWTH OF FOREIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
The "friendly invasion" of foreign banks into the United States
has followed closely on the heels of growing involvement by American
banks in international banking.2 These two developments are interde-
pendent, and have been supported by various factors in a subtle and
indirect manner. These include the significant involvement of the
United States in foreign trade, the importance of this country as a
source of loanable funds, the special role of the dollar in international
* Professor of Economics and Finance, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York.
1. AMERICAN BANKER 188-89 (July 31, 1975); Address by George W. Mitchell, New
York As a World Financial Center, Conference, June 10, 1974.
2. The term "friendly invasion" is borrowed from the title of an unpublished
dissertation by R. CASSIDY, THE FRIENDLY INVASION-FOREIGN BANKS IN NEw YORK
STATE (1968). For comparative data on the role of U.S. banks and banks of other
countries in international banking see F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL BANKING & FINANCE 11-
15 (1974).
464 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
finance, the size and efficiency of American banking institutions, and
the highly developed securities markets in the United States.
The recent growth of foreign banking in the United States is part
of a broad pattern which includes the internationalization of global
business. The inflow of foreign banks is a concomitant aspect of the
flow of foreign investment into the United States. In the period 1960-
1974, foreign investment in this country expanded from $40 billion '
to over $160 billion.4 This investment took the form of securities
investment in U.S. stocks and bonds, direct or business investment
in manufacturing and distribution facilities, and short-term invest-
ment in liquid money market assets.5
All three forms of investment are intimately associated with the
expanding role of foreign bank operations in the United States. For-
eign business investments in U.S. manufacturing attract foreign
banks interested in retaining corporate customers. For example, Eu-
ropean banks have found it necessary to establish banking offices in
the United States so as to service the financing requirements of
American subsidiaries of home country firms, as well as to provide
these firms with information and business contacts.'
Foreign investment in U.S. securities reflects the many advan-
tages available to foreign investors in the efficient, low cost U.S.
capital market. Here foreign banks provide non-U.S. investors with
information on U.S. securities investments, manage investment port-
folios on a multinational basis for non-U.S. customers, and operate
U.S. securities affiliates which underwrite new securities issues and
engage in many other securities market operations.' Short-term in-
vestment in the United States reflects the direct participation of
foreign commercial banks in U.S. deposit and money market opera-
tions, and the advance of funds by parent foreign banks to their U.S.
branches and agencies for loan and investment in the U.S. money
market. In the relatively short period 1972-1974, foreign liquid claims
in the United States increased from $82 billion to $112 billion
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 855
(1963).
4. Author's estimate as extrapolated from other data.
5. The third category, short-term investment in liquid money market assets, ac-
counted for the largest part of the growth in foreign investment in the United States.
In 1974, foreign short-term investments in the United States represented $112 billion,
or 70% of the total of $160 billion of foreign investment in the United States. 61 FED.
RES. BULL. A63 (1975).
6. Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of
Operations, MONTHLY REVIEW of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 142-45 (June
1973).
7. Lees, Foreign Investment in U.S. Banks, 8 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 4, 13-14
(1973).
8. 61 FED. RES. BUL.. A63 (1975).
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In addition to the need to service home country investments in
the United States, foreign banks enjoy numerous other advantages
from their expanded presence in the United States. These include
opportunities for dollar sourcing, ability to achieve more rapid
growth, and increased international portfolio diversification.
Despite persistent balance of payments deficits, the devaluations
of 1971 and 1973, and renewed inflation in the United States, the
dollar has been an attractive and sought-after currency by interna-
tional bankers and businessmen. Therefore, many foreign banks have
been prompted to establish U.S. banking offices to develop a base
from which they can supply the dollar requirements of the bank. U.S.
banking offices provide an excellent depository and clearing center
for dollar operations of the parent bank. The New York office or
affiliate of a foreign bank may be asked to extend overdrafts to other
units of the parent institution. An important advantage of a dollar
operating base is the ability to operate in the foreign exchange market
after the head office in Europe has closed for the day. Access to the
New York financial market permits the U.S. office of a foreign bank
to invest dollar balances acquired either for its own account or for the
account of the head office. Finally, a dollar based office can operate
in either direction, as a source of liquidity when the parent bank is
facing a credit squeeze at home, or as a lender of funds when the
parent bank does not have more attractive alternative uses of funds.
Foreign banks operating in the United States have not confined
their activities to wholesale banking. Many of these institutions have
achieved significant deposit and loan growth via retail banking opera-
tions. A small number of U.S. based affiliates of foreign banks rank
among the fifty largest banks in the United States. The attainment
of additional growth through retail banking tends to complete the
global competitive strategy adopted by large foreign banking institu-
tions.
An important but often ignored motive for the overseas expan-
sion of large banks is the desire to achieve international portfolio
diversification Banks with offices located in several different coun-
tries may expect to achieve minimum risk in their loan portfolios
(and deposit instability) to the extent that business conditions in the
countries in which they operate are negatively correlated. Portfolio
diversification is not efficient unless this negative correlation crite-
rion is met. 0
9. See Ragazzi, Theories of the Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment, Inter-
national Monetary Fund STAFF PAPERS 476-80 (1973).
10. J. WESTON & B. SORGE, INTERNATIONAL MANAGERIAL FINANCE 358-66 (1972).
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ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
Foreign banks employ a variety of organizational forms in their
operations in the United States. These include the representative
office, agency, branch, and corporate subsidiary. The representative
office does not perform banking functions, but is able to facilitate
banking activities. The most important activities of a representative
office are to provide information about the parent bank, to function
as an intermediary in providing information to American companies
interested in offshore financing, and to serve as liaison concerning the
activities of the parent bank.
The agency and branch forms are permitted in several states,
with the approval of the state superintendent of banks." A licensing
requirement must be satisfied. The agency of a foreign bank appears
to resemble a branch. However, agencies may not accept deposits.
Agencies may accept credit balances, which are claims of customers
that result from the clearing and settlement of foreign trade and other
transactions. Branches are authorized to accept deposits, as well as
conduct a general banking business.
Foreign-owned banking corporations generally operate in a man-
ner similar to that of domestic banks. These subsidiaries may be
eligible for Federal Reserve membership and may have deposit insur-
ance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Several New York trust companies owned by foreign banks restrict
their activities to corporate agency functions. However, the majority
of banking subsidiaries in the United States conduct a general bank-
ing business.
Congress has remained silent on the matter of licensing and
chartering foreign banks. At the present time there exists no federal
statute written expressly to deal with the regulation or supervision of
foreign banks operating in this country. Given the absence of federal
banking legislation, foreign banks have turned to the various states
to seek permission to carry on banking activities in the United States.
Only eight states permit the licensing and operation of foreign-
owned banking offices in their jurisdictions. These states treat agen-
cies, branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks as entities requiring
distinct supervision." In general, foreign banks may establish a repre-
sentative office without the formality of obtaining a license.
11. Zwick, Foreign Banking in the United States, in ECONOMIC PoLICIs AND PRAC-
TICES: PAPER 9, prepared for the Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5
(1966).
12. At year end 1974, foreign banks were operating 72 agencies, 77 branches, and
62 banking subsidiaries in the United States. These banking offices were located in
sixteen states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. AMERICAN BANKER
186 (July 31, 1975).
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State chartered subsidiaries of foreign banks have been organ-
ized and supervised in a manner similar to domestic banks. Non-
bank subsidiaries of foreign banks generally are treated according to
the incorporation laws and business practice codes that apply. Three
states (New York, California, and Massachusetts) appear to be the
most permissive and allow any kind of foreign bank operation includ-
ing agency, branch or banking subsidiary. California law requires
that branches of foreign banks provide FDIC deposit insurance on
domestic source deposits. 13 Present federal statutes do not provide for
FDIC insurance on U.S. branches of foreign banks, and branch opera-
tions in California are not yet feasible.' Nevertheless, agencies in
California are permitted to accept deposits from foreign sources. Due
to the restriction on branch deposit operations, the state chartered
subsidiary has been a popular means of representation for foreign
banks in the United States.
New York amended its banking laws in 1960 to permit the estab-
lishment of branches by foreign banks. The agencies, branches, and
subsidiary banking institutions in New York account for approxi-
mately three-fourths of the resources of foreign banks in the United
States.
Several states prohibit foreign bank branches (Delaware and
Texas), while others (Connecticut, Florida and Maryland) will not
permit foreign bank representation in any form. In general, the re-
maining states have enacted no statutory provisions which refer to
the establishment of foreign bank operations in their respective juris-
dictions.
While foreign banks face a mixture of state laws and regulations,
over 160 banking institutions from other countries have established
direct representation in the United States. At midyear 1974, these
foreign banks were operating over 140 representative offices, 62 agen-
cies, 66 branches, and 30 banking subsidiaries in this country. The
largest number of these banks and banking offices was located in New
York. California ranked second only to New York in this respect.
Illinois ranked third in importance. Other states hosting foreign bank
agencies, branches, or bank subsidiaries included Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon and Washington. In addition, several
foreign banks operate securities affiliates and specialized finance
companies in the United States.
13. CALIFORNIA SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, REPORT ON FOREIGN BANKING MATTERS
23 (April 1974).
14. Similarly, federal law does not provide for FDIC insurance coverage on depos-
its in the overseas branches of American banks. See F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
& FINANCE 45 (1974).
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ROLE PLAYED IN U.S. CREDIT MARKETS
The growing importance of foreign banks in the United States
has injected new competition into the credit markets, has led to the
more complete internationalization of our money market, and has
posed serious questions and problems to bank regulatory agencies
and lawmakers regarding the adequacy of the banking structure in
the United States.
It is a widely accepted fact that foreign banks have become im-
portant participants in the U.S. credit markets. These institutions
play an active role in bank loan syndicate placements where a
medium-term corporate borrower may be serviced by a dozen or more
banks, each taking a relatively small portion of the total credit. Bank
participation in medium-term loan syndications parallels the ar-
rangements that have developed in the Eurodollar market, and cross-
competition is reflected in the closer alignment between Eurodollar
lending rates (London Interbank Offer Rate-LIBO) and the U.S.
prime rate. The importance of foreign bank participation in the U.S.
loan markets is reflected by concern of Federal Reserve authorities
over the extent to which inflows and outflows of funds facilitated by
foreign banks operating in the United States neutralize monetary
policy measures.5
The expansion of foreign banks in the United States has followed
a pattern that threatens to upset the balance of power in the credit
markets. Foreign banks have not conformed to two aspects of the
American banking structure, namely the restrictions on interstate
banking and the separation of investment banking from commercial
banking.
Close to one-third of the foreign banks in the United States have
been able to develop their representation on an interstate basis. This
includes several large British, Canadian, and Japanese banks that
simultaneously operate New York agencies and subsidiary banks,
Chicago branches, and California agencies or subsidiary banks. The
interstate operations of foreign banks have influenced the credit mar-
ket structure in the United States in several ways. Interest rates in
regional credit and banking markets have become more closely
aligned. In response to this competitive thrust, large American banks
have prepared themselves for interstate operations and sought legis-
lative change that would permit them a wider geographic base of
15. G. Bell, in THE EURODOLLAR MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
103-104 (1973) notes that a tightening of monetary conditions in the United States
followed by reduced lending to U.S. companies could be followed by these companies
borrowing in the Eurodollar market. He further notes that arbitrage opportunities will
exist for transfer of Eurodollar funds in New York within a matter of hours after the
transaction has been consumated.
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operations. Smaller American banks have reacted in a different man-
ner and have supported state banking legislation that would restrict
the expansion of foreign banks in their respective states. State legisla-
tures have reacted in a variety of ways. New York will permit state-
wide branching in 1976, Pennsylvania is considering more liberal
branching laws, and Texas has voted to strengthen an existing prohi-
bition against foreign corporations operating banks."5 We return to
the question of interstate banking in a later section.
American banking structure has been shaped by the 1933
amendments to the federal banking laws. The Banking Act of June
16, 1933 makes it unlawful:
For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other
similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate partic-
ipation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage
at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving
deposits subject to check or to payment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor" ....
As a result, commercial banks in the United States restrict their
underwriting activities to U.S. Treasury obligations and state and
local government bonds, both categories being exempted from the
prohibition cited above. The underwriting of corporate securities is
entirely divorced from U.S. commercial banks.
The separation of commercial from investment banking in the
United States contrasts sharply with the situation in other countries
where banking institutions perform both functions. In Great Britain,
well-established merchant banking firms accept deposits, carry on
international banking activities, perform portfolio management func-
tions, and underwrite venture capital projects. Similarly, in Germany
and Switzerland the big banks conduct securities underwriting activ-
ities as an adjunct of their other banking operations. This permits
these institutions to provide full services for their corporate custom-
ers needing long-term financing, and for their wealthy individual
customers who require securities trading and portfolio management
services.
Foreign banks with representation in the United States expect
to provide the same full complement of services for their customers
as they do at home. However, banking laws in the United States
restrict foreign as well as domestic banks from engaging in securities
trading and underwriting activities. As a result, several foreign banks
have established non-bank securities affiliates in the United States
16. This was voted in the Texas Constitutional Convention, held in 1974.
17. Federal Reserve Act as amended through Nov. 5, 1966, 12 U.S.C. §378 (1945).
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which are not subject to the prohibitions against bank underwriting
activities contained in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.' In this way
foreign banks can service home country corporations that wish to sell
long-term securities to finance business investments in the United
States. Also, securities trading operations of these same securities
affiliates permit the retention of valuable customer relationships
where access to the American securities markets is important.
Several foreign bank-owned securities affiliates are members of the
regional stock exchanges, but are not presently permitted member-
ship on the major stock exchanges in the United States.'" Several
securities affiliates of foreign banks have representation in major ci-
ties in more than one state.
PRESENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The existing regulatory treatment of foreign banks provides for
state and federal jurisdiction in the same manner as applies to do-
mestic banking corporations. Regulation of foreign banking has de-
veloped largely as a reaction to problems and visible needs. In gen-
eral, the United States has not applied special legislative or supervi-
sory authority over foreign banks operating in this country and only
a few states authorize establishment of offices by foreign banks. New
York and California license agencies and branches of foreign banks,
while Illinois and Massachusetts permit branches of foreign banks.
In addition, foreign banks have established state chartered banking
affiliates in several states and have acquired ownership interests in
several domestic banks.
Until the present time, the federal government has remained
silent on the question of foreign banking operations. Federal law de-
signed to deal with domestic banks becomes applicable to foreign
banks in several important areas. This includes the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHC Act) as amended in 1970, which places approxi-
mately two dozen foreign banks in bank holding company status. The
BHC Act has provided an explicit statutory framework for the expan-
sion of foreign banking operations in the United States and has ex-
tended uniform treatment to domestic and foreign banks alike.
New York
New York has assumed a major part of the responsibility for
chartering, licensing and supervising foreign banks. Therefore, the
laws, administrative procedures and experience gained there consti-
18. Several German and Swiss banks have confined their U.S. representation to
the New York branch plus securities affiliate, thereby avoiding bank holding company
status and Federal Reserve Board jurisdiction. See Lees, Foreign Investment in U.S.
Banks, 8 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 4, 7-9 (1973).
19. Lorie, Public Policy for American Capital Markets, in REPORT PREPARED FOR
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 18 (Feb. 7, 1974).
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tute the most significant body of regulatory control that presently
applies to foreign banks in the United States. New York embraces
over three-fourths of the foreign bank resources located in the United
States and its banking laws have attended to this responsibility with
scarcely any need for special statutes applicable to foreign banking
institutions 0
In New York, chartering procedures and requirements for a for-
eign controlled bank, trust company or investment company are simi-
lar to those required for all domestic commercial banks. The Superin-
tendent of Banks issues licenses for agencies and branches with ap-
proval of the Banking Board. State law requires that a foreign bank-
ing corporation that operates a branch office in New York must de-
posit specified assets with the Superintendent. A foreign bank may
be licensed to maintain a branch in New York only if the laws of its
country grant reciprocal privileges to New York chartered banks.
New York banking law establishes minimum requirements of
capital stock in the formation of banks and trust companies, but the
scope of operations of the proposed bank is also considered in estab-
lishing such minimum levels. A foreign bank wishing to obtain a
branch or agency license must have assets of at least $1 million, but
again these statutory minima are far exceeded in the application of
supervisory authority. New York branches of foreign banks must
maintain specified types of assets equal to at least 108 percent of
liabilities payable at or through the New York branch.
In New York, all banks, trust companies and branches of foreign
banks are subject to the same size restrictions on individual loans. A
bank may lend unlimited amounts to the U.S. government, New York
state, or other governmental entities. Loans secured by cash collat-
eral or government securities are also exempt from lending restric-
tions. Loans to states other than New York or foreign nations are
limited to 25 percent of the bank's capital and surplus. Similar limits
apply to loans connected with the creation of banker's acceptances.
Unsecured loans and loans to other categories of borrowers are limited
to ten percent of the bank's capital and surplus. A separate limitation
applies to loans on letters of credit (ten percent of capital and surplus
if non-documentary and 25 percent if secured by documents).
New York banking law prohibits the acceptance of deposits by
any business entities except banks, trust companies and New York
branches of foreign banks. Agencies and investment companies of
foreign banks are not permitted to accept deposits. They may, how-
ever, maintain credit balances.
20. An exception to this would be the legislation passed in 1969 permitting foreign
banks to establish branch offices in New York. N.Y. BANK LAW § 201-a (McKinney
1971).
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The Banking Department in New York enjoys a number of
supervisory powers over banking institutions, including the power to
conduct examinations and issue examination reports, authority to
issue supervisory letters based on examinations, moral suasion, the
power to require reports of conditions and the authority to review
director's examinations. The examination report assures compliance
with legislative policy and reflects management effectiveness. The
typical examination report covers the examiner's comments relating
to the condition of the banking institution, statement of assets and
liabilities as found by the examiner, summary of examination high-
lights, information concerning the quality and diversification of the
investment portfolio, a listing of assets criticized by the examiner, a
review of the foreign exchange position and the examiner's comments
on operating procedures and internal controls.
This writer is of the opinion that the New York State Banking
Department is in a position to administer the banking laws and su-
pervise foreign banks in a reasonably effective manner. While a rapid
expansion has taken place in foreign banking operations in New York,
there is no evidence of deterioration in quality standards.
Other States
California ranks second in importance in terms of the extent of
foreign banking operations in the United States. California has
adopted a liberal policy toward foreign banking activities and permits
the establishment of state chartered subsidiaries, agencies and
branches. California banking law has required that operation of a
branch by a foreign bank be permitted only on condition that FDIC
insurance coverage apply to deposits in that branch. California law
permits an exception for foreign source deposits not protected by
FDIC insurance. Federal law does not provide for FDIC insurance on
deposits in American branches of foreign banks and this has pre-
cluded branch operations in California. However, California does per-
mit branches to accept foreign source deposits without FDIC insur-
ance.
Illinois ranks as the third most important state for foreign banks.
Prior to 1973 foreign banks were able to establish state chartered
subsidiaries and representative offices in Illinois. In that year the
Foreign Office Banking Act was passed by the Illinois legislature,
making it possible for foreign banks to establish a single branch office
in the Chicago Loop Area. This Act brought forth considerable con-
troversy inasmuch as Illinois is a unit banking state (no branching
permitted).
Florida provides a contrast to California and Illinois, in that it
has not adopted a liberal approach toward foreign bank operations.
Florida is a unit banking state which provides significant opportuni-
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ties for holding company expansion within the state. Only one bank,
owned by a Canadian trust company, is controlled and operated by
foreign shareholders. This acquisition took place in 1972 and was
preceded by an amendment to the Florida banking laws which pro-
hibited the acquisition of Florida trust companies by foreign holding
companies and banks. However, this new statute did not take effect
until shortly after the acquisition.
Federal
Domestic and foreign banks are subject to a uniform set of fed-
eral laws and supervisory regulations. The Congress has not enacted
any special laws that pertain to foreign banking activities in the
United States.
Three federal agencies enjoy supervisory powers over foreign
banks. The Federal Reserve Board has jurisdiction over BHCs which
include foreign banks that own and operate banking subsidiaries in
the United States. In addition, the Federal Reserve enforces the pro-
visions of the Glass-Steagall Act in cases of banks subject to its juris-
diction. The FDIC has supervisory jurisdiction over insured banks
and all state chartered banking institutions owned by foreign banks
have FDIC protection. This includes FDIC authority to conduct ex-
aminations. Finally, the Comptroller of the Currency enjoys regular
supervisory authority over national banks including the power to ex-
amine and report on their condition and status.
TOWARD FEDERAL REGULATION
The growth and expansion of foreign banking have generated
problems as well as benefits for the United States. These problems
relate to 1) the need to strengthen monetary policy in light of the
increased scope for inflows and outflows of credit funds, 2) the fear
of developing inequities in regulatory treatment between domestic
and foreign banks, and 3) the possible need for special regulatory
treatment of foreign banking institutions in the United States. In the
discussion which follows we examine these problem areas, view recent
regulatory proposals in light of the problems faced, and point to basic
issues that require resolution.
Governor Mitchell of the Federal Reserve Board has pointed out
that international credit flows through foreign owned banking insti-
tutions are not subject to Federal Reserve jurisdiction.2 In June 1973
the Federal Reserve Board requested foreign banks operating in the
21. Address by George W. Mitchell, Bankers Association for Foreign Trade, An-
nual Convention, Coronado, California, April 8, 1974. This is because non-member
banks (state chartered subsidiaries of foreign banks) are not subject to Federal Reserve
jurisdiction with respect to monetary policy controls and U.S. agencies and branches
are not eligible for membership in the Federal Reserve System.
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United States to conform voluntarily to marginal reserve require-
ments imposed on large certificates of deposit and net Eurodollar
borrowings."2 Large domestic banks are subject to such reserve re-
quirements and the voluntary reserve requirement closed a monetary
policy gap that had been of concern to the Federal Reserve. In addi-
tion, it tended to offset an advantage that foreign banks held in the
area of reserve requirements on deposit liabilities. This advantage
continues in part, since foreign bank branches and state chartered
subsidiaries that are not members of the Federal Reserve enjoy lower
cost reserve requirements. This is due to the fact that while most
states have percentage reserve requirements that are close to those
of the Federal Reserve, many states permit these reserves to be held
in the form of interest-earning government securities. The Federal
Reserve permits only cash assets to be counted in satisfying reserve
requirements on deposit liabilities."
It has been argued that foreign banks enjoy certain competitive
advantages over domestic banks in this country. These advantages
are derived from the ability of foreign banks to operate on an inter-
state basis, the investment banking operations of foreign banks in the
United States, and their exemption from FDIC insurance require-
ments and insurance premium assessments.
From a practical standpoint foreign banks are not an important
factor in the securities or investment banking industry in the United
States. Several large Swiss and German banks simultaneously oper-
ate New York branches and securities affiliates. Where bank holding
company jurisdiction applies, the Board of Governors has effectively
sought to maintain the separation of investment from deposit bank-
ing. U.S. banks are not able to operate domestic securities affiliates
in competition with foreign banks. However, they do operate such
companies overseas via their Edge Act affiliates, which are permitted
to own shares in such companies. It is also possible for U.S. banks to
service the longer-term credit requirements of their domestic corpo-
rate customers by providing medium-term loans individually or in
syndication with a group of commercial banks. Moreover, large com-
22. 61 FED. RES. BuLL. A7 (1975). These reserve requirements apply to member
banks of the Federal Reserve System. Non-member banks enjoy a cost of funds advan-
tage since they are not subject to such reserve requirements. Moreover, foreign banks
with offices in the United States derive a second advantage since they may have access
to lower cost funds in money markets outside the United States.
23. It should be noted that domestic non-member banks enjoy this same advan-
tage and that their resources are four times as large as those of foreign banks in the
United States. On December 31, 1973, total assets of insured non-member banks were
$170.8 billion. 61 FED. RES. BULL. A15 (1975). This compares with approximately $40
billion in resources of foreign banks as cited by Governor George W. Mitchell, supra
note 1.
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mercial banks render a number of investment banking services in the
areas of financing and facilitating corporate mergers, providing stock
purchase plans for customers, and managing investment portfolios of
individual customers and pension funds.
The interstate representation of foreign banks in the United
States poses genuine problems for government policy makers. On the
one side are the complaints of domestic bankers, some of whom are
not permitted to establish branch offices in their own states. On the
other side is the desire of regulatory agencies to permit competitive
pressures to develop in banking markets so as to erode any excess
profits that might exist in narrowly defined geographic market sec-
tors. It is difficult to criticize the competitive advantages enjoyed by
a handful of foreign banks when these same banking institutions are
introducing into banking market sectors competition that results in
lower loan rates and higher deposit rates for depositors."
Foreign banks operating state chartered bank affiliates have ob-
tained federal deposit insurance protection for depositors. As a mat-
ter of practicality all but several hundred of the smallest banks in the
United States have obtained deposit insurance coverage. Branches of
foreign banks are not eligible for deposit insurance coverage, although
this matter was given serious consideration after the demise of the
Intra Bank in 1966. In that case the New York branch of the Lebanese
bank was forced to close its doors when the parent institution went
into bankruptcy. 5
While it is alleged that branches of foreign banks in the United
States enjoy a competitive advantage in not being required to obtain
FDIC insurance protection, the cost burden on insured domestic
banks is not significant. Moreover, a significant part of deposits
housed in these branches is held by non-resident business firms con-
ducting trading and manufacturing activities in the United States.
Therefore, there may be no competitive factor involved in bidding for
such deposits. In this connection, these foreign branches represent an
extension of the parent bank and it seems questionable whether de-
posit insurance is necessary or even desirable for banking institutions
that are appendages of larger parent organizations operating from a
foreign currency base.
REGULATORY PROPOSALS
In 1973, legislative proposals were filed in the U.S. Congress that
would affect foreign bank operations in the United States. In 1974,
24. CALIFORNIA SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, REPORT ON FOREIGN BANKING MATTERS
37-39 (April 1974).
25. For a complete account, see Taylor, The Day They Shorted the Intra Bank,
150 BANKERS MAGAZINE 9 (1965) and F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL BANKING & FINANCE 185-
86 (1974).
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System made public
its own legislative proposal regarding regulation of foreign banks op-
erating in the United States. Our discussion of these proposals fo-
cuses on the reasons for the proposed legislation and the issues sur-
rounding proposed federal jurisdiction.
In 1973, the Patman bill, also known as the Foreign Bank Control
Act, was filed in Congress." Several considerations appear to have
served as motivation for the Patman bill, including the advantages
allegedly possessed by foreign banks over domestic banking institu-
tions, the desire to strengthen monetary policy, and the desire to
preserve competition in banking markets. The Patman bill provides
for federal chartering of foreign owned banks to conduct an interna-
tional banking business and state chartering of foreign owned banks
to conduct a domestic banking business. There would be no alterna-
tive means available for the licensing of foreign banking operations
except that described above.
Under the Patman proposal all foreign bank activities in the
United States would be conducted through subsidiaries. A foreign
bank would be limited to one domestic banking subsidiary whose
operations would be confined to a single state. Foreign banks would
be excluded from states which have laws that prohibit foreign bank-
ing. Individual foreign banks would be limited to five federally chart-
ered international banking subsidiaries. These international banking
subsidiaries would operate in more than one state as Edge Act affili-
ates do in representing domestic parent banks.
The Patman bill prohibits establishment of overseas branches
and subsidiaries by foreign banks headquartered in the United
States. Foreign owned banks would be required to adhere to reserve
requirements of the Federal Reserve. However, foreign bank subsidi-
aries would not be eligible for membership in the Federal Reserve
System.
The Patman bill has been considered somewhat restrictive in its
treatment of foreign banks, and possibly harsh enough to generate a
negative reaction outside the United States. The restrictive attitude
toward foreign bank operations and failure to treat foreign banks on
a par with domestic banks represent significant weaknesses in the
proposal.
Discriminatory treatment in the Patman bill precludes foreign
banks from obtaining national charters to conduct domestic opera-
tions in the United States, thus limiting foreign banks to only one
domestic banking subsidiary, prohibiting mergers or consolidations of
26. H.R. 11440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
VOL. 5:463
FOREIGN BANKING
foreign bank subsidiaries with domestic banks, barring foreign bank
subsidiaries from Federal Reserve membership, limiting foreign
banks to five international banking subsidiaries (whereas there is no
statutory limit on the number of Edge affiliates a member bank of
the Federal Reserve may operate), and prohibiting international
banking subsidiaries from establishing foreign branches or foreign
equity investments.
The Federal Reserve proposal was submitted to Congress in
19737 and resubmitted early in 1975.28 Included among the considera-
tions mentioned by the Federal Reserve in transmitting this legisla-
tive proposal were the following: differences in state regulatory treat-
ment of foreign banks (ranging from complete exclusion to liberal
treatment), interstate banking by foreign banks, lack of restraint on
non-banking activities, the fact that few foreign banks are members
of the Federal Reserve System which excludes a growing sector of
money and credit from monetary policy, and the fact that the Federal
government can play only a limited role in foreign bank operations
even though this may have important implications for U.S. foreign
relations. 9
According to Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Board's proposal would provide
for a federal role in the licensing and chartering of foreign banking
operations. Moreover, it would standardize the status of foreign
banks on the basis of non-discriminatory national treatment aimed
at providing foreign banks with the same opportunity to conduct
banking operations in this country as is afforded domestic banks. The
Comptroller of the Currency would issue licenses for all foreign bank-
ing facilities in the United States and would supervise foreign-owned
national banks and federally insured branches of foreign banks. The
Federal Reserve would exercise supervisory authority under the Fed-
eral Reserve Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. The FDIC
would be required to submit proposals to extend deposit insurance to
branches and agencies of foreign banks.
Under the Board proposal the BHC Act would be redefined to
include branches and agencies of foreign banks, bringing virtually all
foreign bank operations in the United States under the BHC Act.
Equality of treatment would be provided by permitting foreign banks
to seek U.S. representation via federal or state regulatory channels,
thus making available the dual channels that domestic banks pos-
sess. Foreign ownership of national banks would be facilitated by
27. H.R. 11597, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
28. H.R. 5617, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
29. Federal Reserve Board Press Release (Dec. 3, 1974).
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permitting up to one-third of the directors of a national bank to be
foreigners.3 0 In addition, the Comptroller would be empowered to
license branches of foreign banks to conduct a banking business in
any state on the same basis as a national bank. This would provide
foreign banking institutions with a means of entering any of the state
banking markets in the United States.
The section of the Federal Reserve Act pertaining to Edge Act
corporations would be amended 3 to allow foreign banks to establish
and own Edge Act subsidiaries. Under present law a majority of the
shares of an Edge corporation must be owned or controlled by citizens
of the United States and all of the directors of an Edge corporation
must be citizens of the United States. The Federal Reserve proposal
would give the Board of Governors authority to waive these provisions
regarding share ownership and eligibility for directorship.
All branches, agencies and subsidiaries of parent foreign banks
that possess worldwide assets exceeding $500 million would be re-
quired to become members of the Federal Reserve System. This
would extend Federal Reserve requirements and other regulations to
these banking units with respect to their operations in the United
States. In return, these institutions would gain access to the discount
and lending facilities of the Federal Reserve.
Subsidiary banks of foreign banking institutions are presently
required by the BHC Act to carry FDIC insurance. The proposed
legislation would extend this requirement to branches and agencies
of foreign banks, assuring that depositors in virtually all banking
institutions in the United States are covered by this insurance.
The Federal Reserve proposal would provide for a national policy
toward foreign banks, in that a federal banking license would be
required for all banking facilities of foreign banks, whether organized
under state or federal law. This would include consultation with the
Secretary of State, insuring that the broadest aspects of economic
relations with the home government are related to the application for
establishing U.S. operations.
The Federal Reserve proposal would limit future multi-state se-
curities company and other non-banking company operations to the
same extent as domestic banks. However, permanent grandfather
status would be extended to existing non-conforming activities. Non-
conforming banking facilities established after the grandfathering
date would have to be divested within two years and non-conforming
non-banking facilities would have to be divested within ten years.
30. At present all of the directors of a national bank must be U.S. citizens. 12
U.S.C. § 72 (1945).
31. 12 U.S.C. § § 611-631 (1957).
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The Federal Reserve bill is regarded as moderate in approach
and, when compared with the Patman bill, appears to be the more
acceptable legislative approach. Foreign banks are placed on a com-
petitive par with American banks and are permitted to operate in a
relatively flexible manner. Existing activities are given grandfather
protection in cases where they do not conform to statutory provisions.
The Federal Reserve bill appeared on the scene approximately
eight months after the Patman bill was filed in Congress. The Pat-
man bill was severely criticized by many U.S. bankers who feared
that foreign governments might become less liberal in their treatment
of U.S. banks. Moreover, this bill was criticized by foreign bankers
who feared that their existing activities in the United States were
threatened. The Patman bill was filed only a few months after the
New York Superintendent of Banks had denied the request of Bar-
clays Bank, Ltd. to acquire the Long Island Trust Company, Garden
City, New York. This decision was interpreted by European bankers
as a denial of reciprocity since American banking and business inter-
ests had grown to absorb a large share of the market in the United
Kingdom, Germany and other countries in Europe.
The Federal Reserve bill had the effect of shifting the trend of
discussion concerning regulation of foreign banking back to a middle
ground and its timing was important in the general context of efforts
by the government to make this country a more attractive focal point
for foreign investment inflows. Very early in 1974, the U.S. govern-
ment and various government agencies had removed all of the con-
trols on private U.S. capital outflows, in part to make the U.S. finan-
cial markets better able to serve as a financial entrepot through which
petro-dollar accumulations of the oil exporting nations could be recy-
cled. The Federal Reserve recognized the important role that foreign
banking institutions could play in directing petro-dollar investments
through the U.S. financial markets. Moreover, the early 1970s had
witnessed a heightened interest on the part of foreign business inves-
tors in establishing U.S. manufacturing and distributing facilities. In
part, these investments have depended on the availability of foreign
banking facilities in the United States.
THE CASE FOR OR AGAINST FEDERAL REGULATION
The case for or against federal regulation of foreign banks is a
complex of interdependent issues and alternatives. Of necessity,
there are trade-offs and a middle ground of views will be woven into
any final legislative action that may be reached. Our purpose here is
to review the reasons espoused for proposed legislation. These reasons
fall into the following major categories: (1) to control capital flows;
(2) to strengthen monetary policy; (3) to assure reciprocity; (4) to
place domestic banks on par with foreign banks in the United States.
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1. Control Capital Flows
Foreign banks in the United States can effect inward and out-
ward capital flows that influence liquidity in the United States. As
direct operating arms of their parent institutions, foreign banking
offices in the United States include in their major activities lending
to non-residents and accepting deposits from offshore areas. In addi-
tion, these U.S. located offices participate in foreign exchange trans-
actions and manage money market investments of parent institu-
tions. Inevitably these activities give rise to capital inflows and out-
flows. Large American banks similarly initiate substantial capital
flows of this type. Other countries are far more exposed to interna-
tional flows of liquid funds than the United States and remain able
to apply appropriate restraint measures against capital flow influ-
ences on domestic liquidity.
2. Strengthen Monetary Policy
Foreign bank agencies and branches in the United States can
operate without being subject to the same degree of reserve require-
ment restraint as domestic banks. International monetary flows
through foreign banking institutions are not subject to Federal Re-
serve jurisdiction. However, foreign banks have complied with the
Federal Reserve Board request that they adhere to voluntary controls
on borrowed funds. 2 Application of reserve requirements by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board can be defended if foreign bank operations are
sufficiently large to present a significant gap in coverage. It is possible
that there may be a greater need to extend uniform reserve require-
ments to all domestic banks (including non-member banks) than to
foreign banks operating in the United States. At year end 1974, assets
of non-member banks were four times the amount of assets held by
foreign banks in the United States.
3. Assure Reciprocity
It is held that reciprocity for U.S. banks operating overseas can
be better obtained by federal, rather than state, regulation of foreign
banks. The definition of reciprocity is an unsettled issue. Foreign
banks hold that an interpretation based on permitting foreign banks
to conduct business according to the rules that apply to domestic
banks is overly restrictive. This is because bank regulation in the
United States is more control-oriented than in other countries. Amer-
ican banks operating overseas enjoy greater flexibility than at home
and obtain more advantages than foreign banks that have branches
or subsidiaries in the United States. The reciprocity argument for
regulation of foreign banking in this country rests on the tenuous
position that denial of reciprocal treatment has been damaging to the
32. This applies principally to borrowing of funds from outside the United States.
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overseas activities of U.S. banks. More important, it rests on the
assumption that foreign governments that have practiced a closed-
door policy could be induced to open the door to U.S. banking institu-
tions. If anything, countries in this category (Canada, Australia) ap-
pear to be adopting even harder policies in this respect.
4. Place Domestic Banks on Par With Foreign Banks in the United
States
It has been said that foreign banks operating in the United States
enjoy certain advantages over domestic banks. Advantages include
lower cost of operation, ability to engage in investment banking activ-
ities, and freedom to operate across state lines. The cost advantages
relate to FDIC insurance assessments where branches of foreign
banks are involved and lower effective costs of reserve requirements
where branches and non-member state chartered subsidiaries are in-
volved. New York branches of foreign banks must conform to the
same percentage reserve requirements and loan limitations as state
chartered banks. A 1969 amendment to the New York banking law
requires that branches and agencies of foreign banks in New York
maintain New York assets equivalent to 108 percent of liabilities.
State chartered affiliates of foreign banks now have FDIC insurance
and only branches of foreign banks enjoy a cost advantage in this
area. An important cost advantage could occur in cases where state
reserve requirements are lower than those of the Federal Reserve.
This is not a significant factor in states such as New York and Califor-
nia where the major part of foreign banking resources is located.
Foreign banks are not important factors in the securities or in-
vestment banking areas in the United States. Quoting the Board,
The securities affiliates of foreign banks are few in number and small in
size with little competitive impact within the securities or banking indus-
tries. For the most part, these securities affiliates engage in brokerage
activities for the foreign customers of the foreign bank and in corporate
financial services such as advice on mergers and acquisitions.3
It is doubtful that the minor exceptions of foreign bank activity in
investment banking are significant enough to justify special federal
jurisdiction.
Interstate operations of foreign banks in the United States prob-
ably represent one of the most sensitive issues concerning unfair ad-
vantages. American banks are able to respond competitively via their
Edge Act affiliates, which permit multi-state representation to con-
duct international banking activities. A number of large U.S. banks
now operate Edge affiliates in several major cities across the nation.
Some interstate representation by foreign banks involves a mix of
33. Federal Reserve Board Press Release 11 (Dec. 3, 1974).
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retail-wholesale banking not fully associated with international fi-
nance. In these cases a competitive advantage accrues to the foreign
bank. Whether this competitive advantage is significant or not is an
open question.
Recent proposals by the New York Superintendent of Banks for
reciprocal interstate banking privileges (with California and other
states) offer a flexible solution. Moreover, this approach would in-
volve minimum interference with state prerogatives over bank legis-
lation. Federal regulators and Congressmen might look in this direc-
tion since it represents a liberalizing rather than a restrictive ap-
proach." Regulatory approaches that place emphasis on liberalizing
the treatment of domestic banks rather than reducing foreign bank
activities to a low common denominator of American practice should
be given priority.
CONCLUSION
Two contrasting legislative proposals have been under considera-
tion for the past one-and-one-half years which would extend federal
jurisdiction over the licensing and chartering of foreign banks. The
Patman bill can be regarded as the more burdensome since it would
restrict foreign banks to one domestic banking subsidiary and to five
international banking subsidiaries in the United States. Federal Re-
serve membership would be required of foreign banks, but there
would be no access to the Federal Reserve discount window. Foreign
banks would be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis do-
mestic banks in several ways, including the limited number of bank
subsidiaries they could control in the United States, exclusion from
states that do not permit foreign banking, a prohibition against using
national chartered banks for domestic operations in the United
States, and a prohibition against foreign owned banks establishing
overseas branches or making equity investments.
The more liberal Federal Reserve proposal would add a second
avenue by which foreign banks could gain access to the United
States, but leave intact the existing procedures by which the states
charter and license foreign banks. All foreign banks with U.S. repre-
sentation would become subject to the BHC Act. Moreover, greater
flexibility would be provided for foreign ownership of national banks
and for establishment of Edge Act affiliates by foreign owned banks.
The legislative proposals described above would significantly af-
fect delicately balanced relationships between state and federal regu-
latory agencies, between large and small banks, between federal re-
serve and other federal regulatory authorities, and between foreign
34. Lees, Which Route for Foreign Bank Regulation?, 157 BANKERS MAGAZINE 53,
55-56 (1974).
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and domestic banks in the United States. More important, they could
affect the status of U.S. banks with heavy overseas investments in
branches, subsidiaries and correspondent bank networks. At year end
1974, the U.S. overseas branch banking system held total reserves of
$150 billion, three times the resources held by foreign banks in the
United States.
The brief made in support of proposed legislation must be ana-
lyzed critically in order to determine how urgent the question of
federal regulation really is. It can be argued quite easily that any
strengthening achieved in monetary policy through the proposed leg-
islation might represent only a marginal improvement. Similarly, the
reciprocity argument does not appear to offer a sound basis for enact-
ment of either of the two legislative proposals. Reciprocity is a diffi-
cult concept to pin down, and has a different meaning for U.S. and
foreign bankers and regulators. Finally, the advantages that foreign
banks are considered to enjoy in comparison with domestic banks are
not significant. One could argue that these advantages may be of
importance to the foreign banks, but not to the U.S. banks against
which they compete. For example, there is no doubt in this writer's
mind that the ability of foreign banks to offer securities services
(underwriting and securities trading) to their regular customers on a
global basis is a critical factor in their being able to retain such
customers. However, the securities affiliates of foreign banks in New
York do not as yet represent a real competitive threat to major U.S.
banks.
If there is not a critical need for extending federal regulatory
authority over foreign banks, what avenue of approach (if any) should
be explored? The answer seems clear. Federal regulatory authorities
should examine the possibilities of liberalizing the regulation of do-
mestic banking institutions. Liberalizing the regulatory treatment of
domestic banks would make it possible for them to respond competi-
tively to the expansion of foreign banks in a more flexible manner,
and in a way that could generate better services and improved effi-
ciency for the user of banking services. Congress now possesses a
unique opportunity. Foreign competitive pressures are generating
changes that suggest the need for adaptation by domestic banking
institutions. Congress can move in either of two directions or do noth-
ing. The two directions that can be followed are (1) to restrict foreign
banks more severely, and (2) to liberalize the regulation of domestic
banks. Provided that an atmosphere of excessive competition is not
engendered, Congress should choose the second of these options.
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